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JOHN WAGNER, aka JACK A.
WAGNER,
Plaintiff arnd .Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12094

EARL C. OLSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

AP·PELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
rrhis is an action for wrongful death of plaintiff's
son, age three years and ten months, struck by def endan t 's automobile, northbound on U. S. Highway 91, in the
City of Layton.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict judgrnen t for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
·
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment, and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or alternatively,
a new trial
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 7 :00 p.m. on Sunday, the 1st day of N ovember 1964, plaintiff was driving southbound in the outside
lane of U. S. Highway 91, in Layton City and observed
the headlights of a vehicle overtaking him rapidly, and
also observed there was a car on his left in the inside
lane. Suddenly, the lights of the overtaking vehicle left
the roadway, and that vehicle ''flipped'' and proceeded
off the west side of the roadway, rolling on its top in
the borrow pit. Plaintiff thought that he might have
somehow been involved, and believed that help would be
needed in any event, and made a U turn, and proceeded
north on U. S. Highway 91 to the point of the accident
and stopped his Falcon station wagon on the shoulder
on the east side of U.S. 91, facing north at a point just
north of where the accident occurred. Plaintiff's threeand-a-half year old son, Michael F. Wagner, was strapped in a seat belt in the front seat. Plaintiff thought
there might be serious injury connected with the accident
which could be a rather grizzly sight for his son, and he
therefore told Michael to stay in the car, and then left
to render assistance. In about two minutes a state trooper arrived, and plaintiff began to head back toward his
car when he heard the screech of brakes in the northbound lanes of traffic, and saw people begin to gather
in the roadway. Observing that this was in the area
where he had parked his car, he hurried over, and saw
one of his son's shoes in the roadway. He then discovered
his son lying in the roadway and called for the state
trooper. An ambulance arrived at the scene and Michael
F. Wagner was transported to the Kaysville Clinic, and
2

died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. (T
104-105)
The automobile that struck Michael F. Wagner was
a 1956 Oldsmobile two-door sedan, owned and operated
by defendant, proceeding north in the inside lane of traffie. Prior to the time the accident accurred, Mr. Olsen
haJ been drinking intoxicating beverages. It was stipulated by counsel for the defendant that the alcohol content of the defendant's blood at the time the blood was
withdrawn, approximately two hours after the collision
was 0.28. Beverly Garcia, a witness for the defendant,
testified that she remembered the defendant's car passing their car parked approximately two car lengths behind the Wagner vehicle, and that there was no unusual
speed involved, and that she heard the squealing of tires
as brakes were applied, and the thump of the car striking
some object. She did not see Michael Wagner go into the
roadway.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT ON CONrrRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
This was an emergency situation. Plaintiff saw an
automobile leave the roadway under conditions that
created a concern in his own mind that in some way he
might have been involved, and the type of accident would
clictate to any normal person that the scene was not a

proper place for a three-and-a-half year old boy. Therefore, the child, who in previous times had obeyed his
father without question, was told to stay in the car and
was strapped in the seat belt in the front seat (T. 104).
None of the facts developed at the trial justified the submission of Instruction No. 16 which reads as follows:
Contributory negligence is negligence on the
part of a person injured which, cooperating v;rith
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury.
One who is guilty of contributory negligence
may not recover from another for any injury suffered; because if both parties were at fault in
negligently causing an injury, the degree of negligence cannot be weighed by the jury (R. 18).
There was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff
on which to base the instruction given for the defendant.
To say that plaintiff was negligent because he did not
take the boy in his arms or take him by the hand to what
appeared at that time to be an obviously bad accident
situation is Monday morning quarterbacking at best. Defendant's witness, Eugene Garcia, did exactly the same
thing when the second accident occurred and plaintiff's
son was killed ( T. 135, L. 17).
But if plaintiff's conduct be less than the standard
of the reasonable, prudent man in an emergency situation, he was contributorily negligent, and this negligence
was the negligence of leaving Michael F. vVagner alone
in the car, not failure to yield right-of-way. In Instruction No. 22, the court stated:
4
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in crossing the highway in the
of. tlus accident was required by law to
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.
You may consider this only in connection with
the conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff
(R 23).
This instruction is irrelevant as to the conduct of
the plaintiff because there is no evidence that plaintiff
failed to yield the right-of-way to any vehicle. The instruction is really aimed at the conduct of the deceased
minor child, three years and ten months old, and if the
instruction is to he given at all, it should be couched in
the language that places the standard of due care at
the age level of the deceased child. In Morby v. Rogers,
122 U. 540, 252 P.2d 231, the court stated at page 234:
We adopt this majority view and conclude
that
rule is ordinarily applicable in
cases involving a law violation by an injured infant, it is at least to be tempered by a proper
consideration of such person's age or capacity.
This consideration is within the province of the
jury under proper instructions from the court.
In Steele 1 Wilkinson, 10 U.2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117
(1960), the court did instruct the jury that a three-anda-half year old boy was not capable of contributory negligence. In any event, this deceased minor was not required to meet the standard of an adult person, and there
is a continuing presumption that he was exercising due
eare for his own safety. Plaintiff did not vicariously fail
to yield the right-of-way through the deceased child, and
if there was a failure to yield right-of-way, it cannot be
chargeable to the plaintiff as the jury was instructed.
1•

5

POINT II
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NOT
A DEFENSE FOR WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT, AND THE JURY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED
BY THE COURT.

It was plaintiff's theory that no instruction on contributory negligence should have been given because:
1. The deceased child was too young to be guilty
of contributory negligence under the facts of this case,
and

2. There was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff in electing to momentarily leave his three-and-onehalf year old son strapped to the seat belt in the front
seat of the car. When the court determined to give the
standard instruction on contributory negligence, plaintiff requested modification of the instruction on the
ground that there was more than sufficient evidence
from which the jury could believe that the defendant was
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct by being under
the influence of alcohol when his car struck the minor
child. The court refused to amend or change the instruction on contributory negligence, or to add a separate instruction which would correctly state the law of this
jurisdiction.
Willful or wanton misconduct is a bar to the defense of contributory negligence. Where the action is
between two persons who do not occupy any special relationship to each other, there is a legally recognized dis6

tinction between ordinary negligence and willful or wanton misconduct, and where the latter exists on the part
of the defendant, he cannot avail himself of the defense
of contributory negligence. Esrey v. Southern Pacific
Co., 103 Cal. 541, 37 P. 500. This distinction was further
supported in Harrington v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 140 Cal.
514, 74 P. 15, where the court stated at page 18:
In either case, the liability would exist; for,
where an act is done willfully and wantonly, contributory negligence upon the part of the injured
person is no bar to a recovery.
Other cases supporting the distinction are Tognar
zzini v. Freeman, 18 Cal. App. 468; Moreno v. Los
Angeles Transfer Co., 44 Cal App. 551; Downelly v.
Southern Pacific Co. 18 Cal.2d, 1963, 118 P.2d 465.
In Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or. 130, 295 P.2d 182, the
court stated at page 186:
\iV e find the weight of authority supports the
definitions of wanton misconduct which we have
set forth supra. Such misconduct is different in
kind and not merely in degree from negligence
ordinary or gross. One guilty of wanton misconduct is subject to liability which is greater in
scope than that which applies to negligent persons
and contributory negligence is generally held to
constitute no defense.

The State of Utah has adopted the reasoning of the
cases herein cited as set forth in Ferguson v. Jongsma,
10 U.2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960). In that case, plaintiff
alleged that while attempting to stop the theft of gasoline from a vehicle parked in the street by his home, the
7

defendant drove his vehicle toward plaintiff forcing
plaintiff to jump aside and then hang onto the side of
the vehicle, thus being dragged along the street, and that
defendant refused to stop his vehicle regardless of plaintiff's plea. The court stated at page 408:
Although plaintiff's own negligence, which
proximately contributed to his injuries, bars his
recovery from a defendant whose mere, ordinary
negligence would otherwise have made him liable
for plaintiff's injuries, his mere, ordinary contributory negligence does not bar a recovery by
plaintiff for injuries proximately caused by defendant's willful, wanton or reckless disregard
for plaintiff's safety (Cases Cited).
Virtually all courts have held that ordinary negligence
on the part of the plaintiff will not bar recovery for aggravated forms of negligence usua1ly characterized as
willful or wanton. Prosser on Torts (3d Ed. 1964, P.
436). Rest. 2d Torts, Sec. 483, 503.
Driving under the influence of alcohol in a drunken
stupor is tantamount to and inclusive of willful misconduct. Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505,
Falls v. Mortensen, Supra. Our guest statute set forth
at 41-9-1 UCA equates intoxication and willful misconduct as being in that class of negligence which will bar
the guest defense. In giving reasons for support of the
rule barring contributory negligence as a defense in
these cases, and excepting these cases from the operation
of the guest statute, the court in Williams, Supra,, stated
at 440 P.2d 509:

8

Several justifications had been offered for
the general rule. Many commentators, as well as
some courts, have criticized the all or nothing aspects of contributory negligence doctrine, which
means that a slight amount of fault on the part
of the victim will exonerate a very negligent defendant, and require the victim who is only partially at fault to bear the entire loss. Willful, wanton, and reckless conduct differs from negligence
not only in degree, but also in kind and in the
social condemnation attached to it, and a serious
wrongdoer should not escape liability because of
the less serious or even perhaps trivial misstep
of his victim.
'rl1e evidence is more than sufficient to support a conclusion by the jury that defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol and was guilty of willful or wanton
misconduct. Because of the contributory negligence instruction (Nos. 16 and 22), the jury may well have believed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
which under the instruction would bar recovery by the
plaintiff. This is error.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20 ON UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT.
All of the evidence elicited from the witnesses at
the trial was aimed to show fault or negligence on the
part of someone. Defendant's theory of the case was not
unavoidable accident, but negligence on the part of plaintiff and the deceased minor, and this theory was adequately set forth in Instruction Nos. 10, 21, 22 and 27.
9

Orme v. Watkins, 267 P.2d 681 (Wash.), involved a
six-year old boy crossing from west to east on the south
side of an intersection and a southbound vehicle. Because of the boy's age, contributory negligence was not
alleged and was threefore not an issue before the jury.
The defendant asked for an unavoidable accident instruction and the court refused. On appeal, the defendant
alleged error because the trial court refused the unavoidable accident instruction. At page 684, the court
stated:
That instruction clearly presented the appellant's theory of the case to the jury. To have
given, in addition, an instruction on unavoidable
accident, would have been surplusage and might
have tended to confuse the jury. After all, the
question confronting the jury was one of negligence. If Mrs. "\Vatkins was guilty of negligence,
whcih was the proximate cause of the boy's injuries, she was liable in damages. If she was not
guilty of such negligence, she 'vas not liable in
damages.
The courts have sometimes approved unavoidable
accident instructions where the defendant can show sudden emergency not of his own making. See for example,
Raz v. Mills, 378 P.2d 959 (Or. 1963). In the case at bar,
the emergency was created by defendant's excessive
drinking and his failure to observe the accident scene
or anyone attemptiug to cross the highway. The defendant didn't even sec the deceased minor until he was about
five feet in front of the vehicle (T. 22, L. 19).
Under the theory of the case presented by the defendant, this accident could not have occurred except
10

for the negligence or fault of someone other than the defendant. This is the thrust of defendant's answer and
'
all of the evidence solicited by the defendant at the trial.
The unavoidable accident instruction was not supported
by any evidence including defendant's expert. In bdermill v. Heunesser, 154 Colo. 496, 391 P.2d 684, the court
stated unequivocally that giving an instruction on unavoidable accident where there is no evidence on which
such a finding could be based, is reversible error. See
also Sulliva;rz, v. Lamarn., 150 Colo. 542, 375 P.2d 92; Allen
l'. Fish, 64 Wash. 2d 665, 393 P.2d 621, 624.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WAS ALLOWED TO GIVE OPINION TESTIMONY ON
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE OR SIMPLY
ASSUMED BY THE WITNESS.
The hypothetical question posed by counsel for the
defendant to his expert witness is as follows:
Then, Capt. Pitcher, I would like, then, for
you to assume the truth of these facts, for the
purpose of expressing an opinion on them: I
would like you to assume that the child, of approximately the age of four years, ran a distance
of 24 feet across a blacktop highway; that the
path of the child, and I am now ref erring to the
defendant's Exhibit No. 2, was directly, or nearly
directly, across the roadway; that an
was proceeding in a generally north directi.on
along the roadway, in the inside lane of traffic;
that this particular automobile traveled 40 fe.et
after the application of brake onto the - that is,
laid down 40 feet of skid mark on the surface of
11

the roadway, and then contacted the child. And
I would like you to assume that this automobile
was traveling at 39 miles per hour before the
brakes were applied, and the wheels were slid·
and that the brake mark on the roadway was ;
uniform mark . . . I would like you to assume
that the individual that we are dealing with had
a normal reaction time. (T. 47)
Defendant's theory of the case was not supported by the
evidence given by the ·witnesses who testified on these
issues. La.Mar T. Chard, a police officer with Layton
City, testified that the shortest skid marks were the rear
wheels and measured 75 feet long, (TS. 4, 5) ; there was
no testimony that the deceased minor ran straight across
the street west from the W aguer vehicle, but counsel for
the defendant placed that thought in the minds of the
jury and in the record by asking the witnesses to assume
those facts (TS. 26, L. 21; TS. 32, L. 14-30; TS. 33, L. 15;
TS. 39, L. 8).
The defendant Earl C. Olsen testified that the deceased minor was five feet directly in front of his right
headlight when first seen by the defendant, and no other
person gave testimony on that point (T. 22, L. 19); defendant also testified that he did not know where the
point of impact was (T. 23, L. 20; T. 41, L. 3); defendant
further testified that in all probability the deceased
minor was angling across the roadway at the time of
impact (T. 28, L. 16; T. 39, L. 13).
Defendant further admitted that he had been drinking prior to impact (T. 32, L. 24), and he categorized
himself as an alcoholic (T. 36, L. 14), and that at the time
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the impact occurred, he would be classed as drunk (T.
43, L. 15; T. 44, L. 10).
Dr. Stewart C. Harvey testified that alcohol does
effect the time-reaction system in the body (T. 86),
and that even alcoholics such as the defendant who have
learned to compensate to some degree, are impaired at
.10 per cent alcohol by weight in the blood (T. 88, L. 16).
Defendant's blood was drawn approximately two
hours after the accident, and the admitted test was 0.28
per cent alcohol by weight.
At the trial, defendant said he had four ounces of
Votlka after impact at the scene of the accident, and
another four ounces at Tanner Clinic. Police Officer L.
T. Chard stated that he did not see defendant drink anything at the scene (T. 20, L. 21), and Police Officer Phil
K. Bodily testified that defendant did not drink anything
while in his presence (T. 66, L. 23; T. 67, L. 30; T. 68,
L. 1), and that when questioned on the night the accident
occurred, the defendant, Earl C. Olsen, told Officer
Bodily that he had not had anything to drink since the
impact (T. 71, L. 12).
Therefore, there is no evidence that the deceased
minor ran straight across the roadway west into the path
of the defendant's vehicle, or that the point of impact
between the vehicle and said deceased minor was 40 feet
after the defendant's vehicle began to skid, or that the
defendant had a normal reaction time of % of a second.
The objection to the entire line of questioning was over13

ruled by the court, and the expert witness was allowed to
give an opinion based on assumption which was obviously
the crux of defendant's case.
In Jones on Evidence, Sec. 371, page 694, it is said:
If there is no testimony in the case tending
to prove the facts which are assumed by the hypothetical question, such question is improper.

See also .McCormick on Evidence, page 31, where it
is stated:
The type of hypothetical questions just discussed, namely, those based on other testimony
in thP case, have the advantage of satisfying the
requirement imposed upon all hypothetical questions that the facts assumed must be supported by
evidence in the case. This requirement is based on
the notion that if the answer is founded on
premises of fact which the jury, for want of evidence, cannot find to be true, then they are equally disabled from using the answer as the basis for
a finding.
In Xenakis t'. Garrett Freight Lines, 1 U.2d 299, 265
P.2d 1007 (1954), the court stated:
The court and jury must be made aware of
the fact, upon which the expert bases his conclusion, otherwise the testimony would he of little
assistance, and there would br no way of testing
the validity of his opinions.
In Trimble i:. Coleman Co., 200 Kan. 350, 437 P.2rl
219, at page 226, the court stated:
The province of an expert witness is to aid
the jury in the interpretation of teclrnical facts or
to assist in urnlerstnndiug the material in evi14

dence. It is not his province to state simple conclusions based upon facts which could be but
which have not been, placed in evidence.
'
See also Fuller v. Lemmons, 434 P.2d 145 (Okl.
1967) and Daiy v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 U.2d 221,
408P.2d186 (1965).
This same drunk defendant is the only one who testified that the deceased minor was running across the
street; the testimony developed from defendant's witnesses shows that defendant was traveling in the outside lane much closer to the impact point than he was
willing to admit, and that in fact, he turned into the inside lane just prior to the time he applied his brakes
( T. l 34, 135), and the minor child may well have cleared
the outside lane in which defendant was traveling and
thought he was perfectly safe in the inside lane, and was
run down when defendant changed lanes just prior to the
beginning of his skid mark.
POINT V
THE TRIAL C 0 UR T IMPROPERLY
LIMITED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS.
Plaintiff tried to cross-examine defendant's expert
witness to determine whether or not that expert witness
would also support plaintiff's theory of the case. At page
53 of the transcript supplement, counsel for plaintiff
asked Capt. Pitcher a hypothetical question that would
support plaintiff's theory of the case. The court improperly sustained defendant's objection on the ground
15

that the hypothetical question asked went beyond the
scope of cross-examination for the purpose for which the
evidence was offered by the defendant.
An opponent's expert witness may be cross-examined
by the use of hypothetical questions, and specifically, he
may be examined to see whether or not his expertise will
support the cross-examiner's theory of the case. It is
stated at 31 Am. Jur.2d, page 555, Sec. 49:
An expert witness may be cross-examined by
means of hypothetical questions for the purpose of
testing or impeaching his credibility, testing the
accuracy and reasonableness of his direct testimony, contradicting his prior t e s t i m o n y , or
demonstrating that his opinion is consistent with
a theory relied on by the cross-examining party.
This is the general rule in this jurisdiction, and
counsel for defendant cannot limit the operation
of that rule by simply representing to the court
that the hypothetical question was asked for a
specific or special purpose. If the expert is qualified to answer that hypothetical question and has
qualified in areas that support an opponent's
theory of the case, all factors on which he is
qualified to give an opinion may be included in a
hypothetical question which relates to the purpose
for which he was called upon to give testimony.
It was therefore error for the trial court to restrict
cross-examination of defendant's expert in this vital
field. Had the c1·oss-examination continued and the expert beeu allowed to give answers, those answers may
very well have modified the expert's direct testimony
and supported plaintiff's theory of the case.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the emergency situation prevailing when plaintiff stopped his vehicle, there was no negligence on the
part of plaintiff to leave his son strapped in the seat
belt in the front seat of the car. The illogical wand of
disaster should not turn hindsight into negligence. However, if contributory negligence was properly given, in
no event should the plaintiff-father be charged with
failure to yield the right-of-way when he was at the
scene of the other acident across the street at the time
of impact. Any failure to yield right-of-way related to
the actions of the deceased minor, and if contributory
negligence of the deceased minor was to be submitted to
the jury, an instruction setting forth a standard for children of that age should have been given. Plaintiff should
not be guilty of contributory negligence vicariously.
Defendant classified himself as an alcoholic and
drunk at the time of this accident. From the testimony
of Dr. Stewart Harvey, there was more than adequate
evidence that defendant was so intoxicated that he was
in fact in a drunken stupor as alleged in the complaint.
In submitting defendant's theory that plaintiff-father
was contributory negligent, even vicariously, the court
should have also submitted to the jury the willful and
wanton misconduct of the defendant in driving while intoxicated and the fact that contributory negligence is no
defense to such conduct.
The negligence theories pursued in all of the pleadings, and in all other aspects of this case, make an un-
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avoidable accident instruction confusing and misleading
for the jury. If in fact, somebody was negligent, the
only issue to be decided by the jury is the negligence of
the defendant and, where applicable, contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
Finally, the conclusions of defendant's expert were
based on facts not in evidence and on the opinions of
other persons. There was no foundation in factual evidence for the testimony of Capt. Pitcher and the defense
had no right to present such evidence in the abstract
by way of comparison, or as applied to the facts of this
case, because the opinions of the expert witness had a
tendency to give validity to the assumed facts which in
truth did not exist.
For these reasons, a new trial should be granted to
plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
BEAN, BEAN & SMEDLEY
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellaut
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